State Capture and the Credit Rating Agencies in South Africa – by David Masondo

It is the dependency of the state on business that predisposes states under capitalism to be inherently captured by capital. Without business investment, the state cannot generate revenue from taxation in order to undertake its function. If the state leadership or governing political party presides over a declining economy characterised by unemployment and insufficient state revenue to finance social services, it runs the risk of electoral defeat. So, it is in the material self-interest of the state’s incumbents for business to invest.

by David Masondo, ANC National Executive Committee Member. Writes in his personal capacity

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Introduction

Since the release of the former Public Protector’s State of Capture report and subsequent appointment of the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture chaired by Judge Zondo, a lot of ink has spilled over the meaning and analytical utility of the concept of state capture and how it works^[1]. Some critics of the state capture concept, either deny the existence of state capture at all or simply state it is not a new phenomenon^[2].

Lurking behind the debate on the state capture phenomenon is also who has power over the state and how it is exercised. In other words, who rules, and how? And what are the best conceptual tools to analytically describe this mode of rule?

The World Bank defines state capture as an instance in which “control or power passes from state officials and elected representatives to non-state corporate interests”. This is concerning because non-state business actors are not accountable to the electorate and thus put the legitimacy of the elected government into question.

The current South African debate on the phenomenon of state capture is based on impoverished conceptions of state power. Not only because it has drawn our attention essentially to one family that has allegedly unduly influenced certain parts of the state working with some officials and politicians to illegally capture and amass state resources. But mainly because the debate has focussed almost exclusively on the most visible forms of state capture such as bribery, party political funding as well as corrupt and non-corrupt social networks. As a result, the inherent power of business over the state, which does not only reside in direct control, remains clandestine.

In this article, I argue that business^[3] neither needs to use the more overt mechanisms such as outright bribery, corrupt patronage networks; nor have its own political and administrative representatives in the state to wield power over the state; nor have to undertake the undisguised and flagrant political mobilisation against an elected government as we have seen during the 2016-2017 Save South Africa business-led mobilisation. Instead, the ability of business to capture the state largely lies in business’ ability to make large donations to political parties, as well as ownership and control of the investable resources, which enable business to shape state policy action; including political appointments such as cabinets.

The article uses Credit Rating Agencies (hereafter referred as rating agencies) that is, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch^[4] to illustrate how business under the leadership of financial capital, captures the state without using overt mechanisms such as bribery. Contrary to the view that rating agencies merely provide information to potential borrowers of money, I show that rating agencies have become important in influencing state policy action in the quest to attract investment, which may or tend to undermine the democratic will of the people, including national sovereignty.

The article starts by showing the pitfalls of the dominant conceptualisation of state capture, followed by a discussion on how the state is inherently captured by business in general and financial capital in particular. I then continue by showing how the credit rating agencies enable financial capital to exert its influence over the South African state. The article ends with a discussion on possible ways in which the less visible forms of business capture can be combated.

Poverty of state capture

Institutionally described, a democratic state is composed of the executive, judiciary and legislative components. The executive’s authority is supported by administrative systems made up of central banks, bureaucracy, law-enforcement, military apparatuses, surveillance (intelligence agencies) as well as ideological and scientific institutions such as schools and universities.

All political parties exist to capture the state to pursue what they consider good for society. Accordingly, state capture and the transformation of policy by organised democratic forces acting for and with ordinary people is progressive. So, state capture is not inherently bad. It depends on who is doing it, and how, and for what purpose.

As mentioned previously, the World Bank has identified business as a key-actor in the state capture drama. Business refers to a class of people who generate their incomes through making profits. Business people, whose businesses also vary in size and legal forms, are also referred to as capitalists or entrepreneurs; and operate in different economic sectors such as services, industry, finance and commerce.

Business people would also vary in terms of gender, age, race, ethnicity and country of origin. Therefore, whilst all businesses are driven by profit, they also have different specific interests and characteristics depending on where they operate to make profit. They legally and illegally bring their specific business concerns to state institutions, political organisations and personal networks within which they operate. The legal includes lobbying and financing political parties in order to influence policy or allocation of state resources for their individual or industry interests.

In their legal and illegal activities, they would also target different state institutions to pursue their specific interests in the context of profit making. So, for example, entrepreneurs operating in the tobacco industry working with criminal smugglers may be more interested in colonising key government institutions such as customs and police to facilitate smuggling of cigarettes. Or banks may target financial state institutions such as National Treasury. The economic competition amongst business sectors can also find expression politically between parties and within political parties and trade unions.

In addition to bribery and political party funding meant to influence the state and the governing party, businesses also legally use and finance tax-free foundations, trusts and think- tanks such as the South African Free Market Foundation to aid their class perspectives and policy class interests.

Inherent business state capture

To say that businesses such as Anglo-American, Standard Bank and Pan Mixers SA do not necessarily need to have their direct representatives in the state does not mean they would not want it^[5]. Privileged access to state politicians, officials and governing majority party or coalition parties can only enhance their competitive position against other business sectors in relation to state policy and state-owned resources. In fact, some aspirant and emerging businesses as in our post-colonial situation depend on state owned economic resources to enter into business; and maintain their business operations.

Business class power lies in its ownership and control of economic resources such as finance, land, mines, banks and industry. Ownership and control of these economic resources give business power to determine when, where and how to invest. States, on other hand, depend on business investment decisions for economic growth, employment creation and revenue generation (tax) because states do not control and own significant economic assets. Even in periods of economic recession, business can use economic crisis to make policy demands in exchange for investment.

It is the dependency of the state on business that predisposes states under capitalism to be inherently captured by commerce. Without business investment, the state cannot generate revenue from taxation in order to undertake its functions such as the provision of social services, building economic infrastructure and administering the legal framework within which business competes. If the state leadership or governing political party presides over a declining economy characterised by unemployment and insufficient state revenue to finance social services, it runs the risk of electoral defeat. So, it is in the material self-interest of the state’s incumbents for business to invest. Hence, it is not by accident that the former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan would argue that: “We have to generate confidence amongst our investors”^[6].

 

Not all sections of business have the same degree of policy influence over the state. The structural capacity of investors to punish or capture the state depends on the nature of their investment. The ability to move invested resources determines business’ capacity to punish states. If it is difficult for business to move resources to another location, it (business) can adopt a wait-and-see approach because moving may at a particular time be too expensive or impossible. High business mobility (such as with finance) and high asset liquidity increases business power to resist undesirable government policy.

Place and Role of Credit Rating Agencies in investment

Credit rating agencies play a major role in enabling investors under the leadership of financial capital to exercise their power over where and when to invest. For the larger part of the 20^th century, rating agencies played a key role mainly in the USA and European markets. It is only in the 1980s that rating agencies started to play a prominent role outside developed capitalist countries when states in the global south started to increasingly borrow money in international markets. In the 1960s and 1970s, the USA was willing to provide grants, soft loans to third world countries to ward off the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. Since the 1990s, the USA has been actively encouraging African states to be credit-rated by the agencies so that they can gain access to private global financial capital.

Before we discuss the role of rating agencies in enabling financial capital to capture the state, it is important to discuss the importance of money credit and associated financial institutions (e.g. insurance companies, mutual funds, divisional investment banks and pension funds) – in investment for economic growth.

The main role of financial credit institutions is two-fold. The first is to mobilise financial resources from different economic actors. Second, is to redistribute the mobilised funds to different actors and economic sectors. If the cost of money capital is high, investments ought to yield higher returns, otherwise the investment will not be profitable. The lower the rating the higher the cost of borrowing and servicing debt. So, how loaned-money is invested; and its cost, influences the growth or stagnation of certain economic sectors.

Governments also borrow funds through bonds to finance budget deficits. The South African government – debt is at R2.7 trillion^[7] and pays R180 billion interest on its debt annually. As mentioned earlier, rating agencies assess and provide information to financial investors about the ability of private companies and governments to repay debt on time.

The rating range extends from the best AAA (triple A) to worst D (default).The rating depicts the possibility of debt non-payment. A triple A means there will be no default; and triple B means there is some risk for default, but still worth investing (investment grade). Anything below BBB is junk. In 1994 South Africa had a BB rating which was the lowest grade. Between 1996 and early 2000s due to budget surplus in 2002 associated with the global commodity boom, South Africa received favourable credit ratings. Since the global crisis, South Africa has experienced fiscal crisis leading to downgrading.

The higher the probability for default, the higher the cost of borrowing. Conversely, a positive credit rating translates into lower interest rates, thus lowering borrowing and debt service costs. So, if the borrower is considered as likely to default, the cost of borrowing and debt repayments become higher.

The assessment of the rating agencies can encourage or discourage investment. The agencies are very important for investment flows in two respects. Firstly, investors use their assessments to determine whether to invest their monies in certain companies and nation states. For instance, Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds, prohibit pension funds being invested in junked states. In 2001, the US pension managers bought South African bonds because of good rating^[8].

Factors to determine creditworthiness: Economic growth policies, political leadership etc.

In assessing the ability of governments to repay their debt on time, rating agencies assess factors such as economic growth. Which is usually linked to certain policies adopted or under consideration by a governing political party and state political leadership. High economic growth sets the necessary conditions for the possibility of generating tax revenue. Rating agencies use concepts such as negative, stable and positive to also express the prospects of economic growth in a country.

Contrary to their disingenuous claims, rating agencies do make economic growth policy recommendations by either affirming or condemning existing government policies. Fitch downgraded the South African government on the basis that amongst other reasons, its policies were not appropriate to address South Africa’s economic growth requirements^[9]. The rating agencies complained that the 2016/17 Budget Speech lacked “significant policy announcements that we think would immediately spur GDP growth or provided much needed business confidence to the private sector”^[10].

The rating agencies’ economic growth policy recommendations are based on a neo-liberal mantra toolkit such as privatisation, inflation-targeting, and regressive tax regimes such as VAT increase. Rating agencies see privatisation and VAT increase as mechanisms to raise revenue to repay debt, even if they hurt the poor^[11]. The agencies have been advocating for flexible labour market policy to enable employers to hire and fire with ease^[12]. Furthermore, they have been concerned about the introduction of minimum wage^[13].

Investment strike as a mechanism to influence state policy and composition of state leadership

To exert its power over state policy and action, business, including financial capital, use investment strike through threats or actual disinvestments whilst simultaneously making political demands such as policy and legislation changes and political appointments such as government cabinet, as a condition for reinvestment^[14].

Moody’s reason for downgrading South Africa in 2008 also had to do with disapproval of using state interventionist actions such as BEE in redressing racialised inequalities^[15]. In contrast to this, Moody’s drew solace from the fact that key government economic positions are occupied by centrist politicians committed to economic policies aligned to the rating agencies^[16].

In 2016, business in South Africa stated they would only invest R500 billion, hoarded in their balance sheets, if their policy changes around the Protection of Investment Bill and Black Economic Empowerment requirements on the mining charter and toning down on land expropriation and foreign land ownership; and public sector wage bill^[17] were not realised. The regulations included the 2013 Minerals and Petroleum Development Bill which empowered the state to designate minerals to be sold at discounted prices to local manufacturers, failing which they may not be exported without prior consent^[18]. This policy would have changed the colonial division of labour in which former or neo-colonies export raw materials and minerals for processing in the core countries.

The threat, or the actual demonstration of power to undertake a business investment strike can have a long term effect by ensuring policy compliance for future governments. The fear of being downgraded tends to force elected public representatives into a ‘must comply’ response – with business’ policy menu to maintain investor confidence^[19].

The December 2016 downgrade illustrates how business uses rating agencies to demand state policy action, and appointment of state political leadership. On 4th December 2016 Fitch and S&P downgraded South Africa to a negative outlook; and on the 15th Moody’s also did the same and later changed to BBB minus, which is a sub-investment grade – one notch above junk status. The downgrade was done after former Finance Minister Nene was replaced by Des Van Rooyen, who was later changed amidst the fears and speculations of a nuclear deal with Russia. Bank’s CEOs successfully demanded the re-appointment of former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, to restore investor confidence when South Africa was on the verge of being downgraded to junk status ^[20].

The 2016 business’ intervention impeding a further downgrade of South Africa to junk status was skilfully used by business to make more policy demands on the state. As part of its strategy to avert the downgrade, the Banks CEOs produced their 8 Point Plan, which demanded amongst other things, government cuts on expenditure and raising taxes through adopting a regressive tax policy by increasing VAT and the fuel levy to increase state revenue^[21]. As a result, VAT was increased in 2018 without a democratic discussion within the ANC, and was celebrated by Moody’s^[22].

Around March 2017, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan was replaced by Malusi Gigaba; and business became unsure about policy continuity^[23]. As a result, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s downgraded South Africa to junk status, whilst Moody’s retained South Africa’s investment grade rating. After the downgrade, Sibanye Gold stated that they would not invest in South Africa because of government policies^[24]. Newly appointed Finance Minister Gigaba had to visit rating agencies in Washington DC and New York, and also meet international and domestic investors to try to improve their confidence in the government’s commitment to continue with fiscal discipline and the broader neo-liberal policy framework^[25].

Moody’s responded positively to the leadership outcomes of the 54^th ANC conference and re-appointment of Nhlahla Nene to the Finance Minister’s position^[26]. However, the ratings agencies (i.e. Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) maintained South Africa’s – junk status, but moved the economic outlook to a stable outlook from negative. Part of the reasons for the stable outlook was the firing of Malusi Gigaba, mineral resources and public enterprise Minister which was seen as restoring the institutional deterioration associated. The second reason was the ‘political revival’ associated with political certainty and policy certainty^[27]. But they successfully pressed ahead with their demands in the 8-Point Plan, which also led to the increase in VAT to 15 per cent, as mentioned earlier.

ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance and rating agencies

Whilst the episodic 2016-2017 changes of South African finance ministers had little to do with the left-right ideological divide in the state, business in general uses its control over investment decisions to reward and capture the state through ideologically-friendly political leaders. And penalise those they consider ideologically unfriendly until they comply with their policy expectations and needs. As a result, politicians, even within the ANC-led movement, strive to be credit-rated positively by the rating agencies.

In the context of South Africa, the composition of the ANC leadership and the continuation of the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance do not serve to give South Africa a good rating. In 1998, the rating agencies signalled that they were concerned about the continued alliance between the ANC-SACP-and COSATU^[28]. In 2011, Moody’s downgraded South African from the triple A grade because of the ANC’s political alliance with the SACP and COSATU^[29].

After the 2007 ANC National Congress, Fitch revised its positive rating outlook on South Africa because of the so-called “left clean sweep of the ANC NEC”’^[30]. It was expected that the newly elected ANC leadership would not change the inflation targeting framework and conservative fiscal policy, but worried that the ANC will adopt “populist policies”^[31]. Once the rating agencies were assured about the maintenance of these policies, the positive outlook was maintained.^[32] Former President Jacob Zuma was quick to assure investors that there would be no policy change after the recall of President Mbeki in 2008 because there was a concern that the SACP and COSATU will push for an abandonment of the conservative fiscal and monetary policies^[33].

Effects of the rating agencies in framing our economic problems, inter-state competition and intra and inter class alliances

Governments are keen to be rated so that they can gain access to international capital markets. This generates competition for investment amongst and within states to adopt policies that may be detrimental to the working class such as VAT increases, labour market polices and tax holidays. This also accentuates the antagonism between working class parties, trade unions; and governing parties. This may also lead to expulsions and co-options of working class leaders and organisations; and splits between working class organisations as it happened with COSATU recently.

The rating agencies are also concerned about ANC’s elective and policy conferences^[34]. In 2007, Moody’s had to wait for the ANC national conference outcomes before it could pronounce its decision on SA sovereign rating^[35]. In 2012, both S&P and Moody’s threatened to downgrade South Africa if the ANC Congress were to adopt “more radical policies” and deviate from conservative fiscal policy^[36]. As a result, some of the members and leaders debate economic policy from the neo-liberal predispositions of the ratings agencies. As one of South Africa’s leading economists, Trudy Makhaya, put it, “Rather than framing our economic aspirations against the needs and concerns of the unemployed or economically excluded, we are more comfortable with relying on the external gaze”^[37].

Not only do the rating agencies consider policies to assess governments’ ability to repay debt in time. They also look at who constitutes the state, thus influencing who gets appointed into economic positions, particularly finance. As a result, leaders seem to embed themselves within financial capital in order to be credit-rated by rating agencies’ ideological standards in order to be appointed in cabinets and to prepare their future careers in the financial sector^[38].

Resisting all forms of state capture

In the current context of the dominance of capital, there is no qualms about state officials and politicians attracting private sector investment. But it (i.e. capital) must, through certain policy instruments, be subordinated to the immediate interests of the working class. Otherwise, it will be making a mockery of ANC conferences and general elections and their democratic outcomes. Furthermore, it is now well known that critical problems such as institutional destruction by corrupt state officials, politicians and non-state actors are true and real, and must be tackled head-on.

The battle-cry of this article has been to critically examine the undue influence of the rating agencies on the democratic post-1994 state, and urge us not to treat the agencies as ideologically neutral and infallible. The year 2011 saw huge criticism of the credit rating agencies. For example, the IMF disagreed with Moody’s rating of South Africa’s fiscal position^[39]. Furthermore, both the National Treasury and South African Reserve Bank disagreed with rating agencies downgrading of SA^[40].

The City of Johannesburg attacked the rating agency for describing the city as insolvent^[41] . In the same year, the former US President Obama criticised the rating agencies for making a ‘terrible judgement’ after S&P downgraded US’s sovereign debt for the first time in history^[42]. The rating agencies have also been seen as conflicted and profiting from Wall Street^[43]. The USA government through its Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that agencies also enabled the 2007/08 global economic crisis^[44]. Moody’s and S&P’s were later fined for enabling the global economic crisis by making incorrect assessments^[45]. The above-mentioned three rating agencies have also received criticism from BRICS countries for being bias against global south states in favour of developed countries^[46].

Lobbying, party political funding, corrupt and non-corrupt social networks between state officials and politicians and business have always been an integral part of overt business state capture mechanisms. Business’ economic power, which is opaque, is the most critical business state capture mechanism which gives investors de facto veto power over state behaviour and action.

Financial capital has established, through rating agencies, an additional channel of influence over state policy and action. That is to say, rating agencies have also become institutional enablers for financial business to determine where to invest, which has also shaped nation state policies and actions. However, both the overt and opaque business-influence enhancing mechanisms are complimentary in enabling business state capture. The ability to influence and corrupt state officials, politicians and organisations is derived from business ownership of economic assets. Therefore, the fight against state capture must take place on two levels, namely state institutional and private ownership of the economic resources which enable business state capture.

At an institutional level, deploying incorruptible and competent state officials and political leadership in the state should be accompanied by strong institutional design that makes it difficult or impossible for business to exert undue influence on state actions and to guard against the abuse of power by individual state officials and politicians.

Business investment power lies in its ownership of the economic resources, whereas working class power lies in its ability to withdraw its labour power and mass protests, and exercising the right to vote. We therefore, need to strengthen working class movements as a counter-veiling social force against business state capture. It remains to be seen if the SACP in its current organizational form and inconsistent ideological orientation can be an organisational force to mobilise and organise the working class as a countervailing force against capital; financial capital in particular as aided by rating agencies in the current conjuncture.

Whilst the recent business-led Save South Africa Campaign played a key role in fighting against the hollowing-out of state institutional capacity, it should not be surprising if in the future, business undertakes active mobilisation and participation in anti-government activities and building of alterative right-wing coalitions to fight against progressive policy actions using the rhetoric of anti-corruption.

The recent experiences in Latin America (e.g. Brazil) have shown how, when they lose elections, right-wing parties resort to anti-corruption campaigns to delegitimise progressive left political parties and movements, and present these movements as threats to good governance. The ANC as a disciplined force of the left, must take a strong stance against corruption including making institutional reforms and – consistently punishing individual corrupt conduct regardless of whom is involved, as part of advancing the revolution. However, progressive institutional reforms will remain susceptible to reversals by business until a different socio-economic system is installed.

1. See Swilling, M. (et al). 2017: Betrayal of the Promise: How is South Africa being stolen. Crispian Olver, C. 2017. How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay: An Inside. Johannesburg : Jonathan Ball Publishers ↑
2. See Seale, W. 2017. In defence of the academic – State Capture and the Failure to Deconstruct Apartheid’s Shadow State : A response to the State Capacity Research Report : ‘Betrayal of the Promise : How is South Africa being Stolen’ ↑
3. I use the concept of business, investor, capital(ist) interchangeably. ↑
4. Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch are the three biggest rating agencies operating in South Africa controlling 95 per cent of the credit rating markets. Investors worldwide rely on them in deciding where to invest their money. ↑
5. In the same way as business would like to have despotic coercion of workers, but may not secure it. However, it does not mean they need to exploit workers.. ↑
6. Maswanganyi, N. ‘SA must earn back trust, says Gordhan’, Business Day, 16 March 2016 ↑
7. 10% of the debt is foreign-currency denominated and 90% domestic. ↑
8. Hazlehurst, E. ‘Editorial’, Financial Mail, 26 October 2001. ↑
9. Bisseker, C. ‘State of the Economy’, – Financial Mail, 01 March 2013. ↑
10. Maswanganyi, N. ‘Budget does not prompt rating move – S&P’, Business Day, 29 February 2016. ↑
11. Ensor, L. ‘Ratings agencies ‘back the budget’’, Business Day, 26 February 2018. ↑
12. Kantor, B. ‘Why agencies should be calling for more SA debt – not less’, Business Day, 19 January 2012. ↑
13. Joffe, H. ‘Year of living on the edge gets off to inauspicious start’, Business Day, 6 January 2016. ↑
14. Mention how business influenced Mbeki government to adopt GEAR ↑
15. Ibid ↑
16. Ibid ↑
17. Maake, M. ‘President to pressed on issues he glossed over’, Business Day 17 February 2016. ↑
18. Leon, P. ‘Keeping Government in Check’, Business Day, 31 October 2016 ↑
19. Joffe, H. ‘SA ‘must not waste’ Moody’s reprieve’, Business Day, 27 March 2018. ↑
20. Joffe, H. ‘This time around Gordhan faces a different ball game’, Business Day, 17 December 2015. ↑
21. ‘Raising VAT lifts flexibility and helps reduce budget deficit’ Business Day TV, (Transcript Service), 27 May 2015. ↑
22. Bisseker, C. ‘On the Up and Up’, Business Day, 18 April 2018. ↑
23. Maake, M and Maswanganyi, N. ‘- Moody’s adds to Gordhan pressures’, Business Day, 17 December 2015. ↑
24. Speckman, A. ‘Business seeks talks with Zuma’, Business Day, 20 April 2017. Menon, S. ‘Business meets Zuma over trust’, Business Day, 28 April 2017. ↑
25. Speckman, A. ‘Business seeks talks with Zuma’, Business Day, 20 April 2017. Menon, S. ‘Business meets Zuma over trust’, Business Day, 28 April 2017. ↑
26. Joffe, H. ‘SA ‘must not waste’ Moody’s reprieve’, Business Day, 27 March 2018. ↑
27. Bisseker, C. ‘On the Up and Up’, Business Day, 18 April 2018. ↑
28. News-view, 07 August 1998, ‘Doom and gloom for South Africa’. ↑
29. Isa, M. ‘Treasury dismisses Moody’s warning’, Business Day, 10 November 2011. ↑
30. Veronica Kalema, Director Sovereign Fitch Ratings, YouTube Interview, 17 January 2008. Isa, M. ‘Rating Agencies give Zuma benefit of doubt: Clean Sweep of Top posts hits share prices on the JSE’, Business Day, 20 December 2007. ↑
31. Editorial Comment, ‘Zuma and the Rand’, Business day, 21 December 2017 ↑
32. Isa, M. ‘Now Fitch Gives SA a ‘stable’ ratings fillip’ Business Day. ↑
33. Isa, M. ‘No Change in SA Investment Rating’ , Business Day, 23 September 2008 ↑
34. Editorial Comment: ‘ANC is flirting with economic danger’, Business Day, 18 May 2012. ↑
35. Outsider Outlook, Business Day, 26 July 2007 ↑
36. Editorial Comment: ‘Rating cut is a wake-up call. A policy shift to reassure investors is unlikely’, Business Day, 01 October 2012. Isa, M. ‘Markets to take knock after S7P downgrade’, Business Day, 15 October 2012. ↑
37. Makhaya, T. ‘Rating Agencies’, Business Day, 17 December 2016 ↑
38. Almost all previous Finance Ministers and senior bureaucrats have joined established institutions of financial capital. ↑
39. Ensor, L. ‘IMF rejects Moody’s warning on SA spending’, Business Day, 17 November 2011. ↑
40. Isa, M. ‘ Euro-zone meltdown ‘would cut South Africa growth even more’’, Business Day, 16 November 2011. Isa, M. ‘Treasury dismisses Moody’s warning’, Business Day, 10 November 2011. Economic Staff. ‘Gordhan criticises Moody’s Sanral downgrade’, Business Day, 02 March 2012. Isa, M. ‘Treasury rejects S&P ‘political risk’s’ claims’, Business Day, 29 March 2012. ↑
41. Pickworth, E. ‘Rating Agency threat to quit ‘appalling’’, Business Day, 15 August 2018. ↑
42. Phakathi, B. ‘In the seat of judgement with their flaws and all’’, Business Day 23 May 2016. ↑
43. Phakathi, B. ‘In the seat of judgement with their flaws and all’’, Business Day 23 May 2016. ↑
44. The Financial Crisis Inquiry: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. New York : Public Affairs ↑
45. ‘Moody’s $864 penalty for ratings in run-up to 2008 financial crisis’, The Guardian, 14 January 2017. S&P were sued for its role in the global economic crisis in 2008. ↑
46. Gossel, S. and Mutize, M. ‘Turmoil undermining Brics countries’global standing’, Business Day 25 May 2017. ↑